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Argentina: the root cause of the
disaster
A recent gathering of more than 100 economists convened to discuss the causes of
the catastrophe in Argentina and the lessons applicable to other emerging markets.
Most speakers focused on various problems of policy implementation, particularly
the failure to tighten fiscal policy during the late 1990s because of political
constraints. The implication is that near-sighted politicians (particularly the
provincial governors), rather than misguided economists, are to blame for the
unmitigated disaster in Argentina. In contrast, our contribution focused on
problems of policy design and put considerable blame on the economists ￿ mainly
Domingo Cavallo and Roque FernÆndez, who came up with the rigid one-peso-
equals-one-dollar currency regime ￿ and on all those at the IMF and elsewhere who
accepted and defended an exchange-rate mechanism that was doomed to eventual
breakdown.
[Editor￿s note: The text that follows is an edited version of remarks delivered by
Arturo Porzecanski, head of emerging markets economics and debt strategy at ABN
AMRO Inc., at a National Bureau of Economic Research conference on the crisis in
Argentina, held in Cambridge, Massachusetts on 17 July 2002 (see www.nber.org/
crisis/argentinaprg.html). Other speakers at the conference included leading
Argentine economic policy-makers from the recent past (Domingo Cavallo, Roque
FernÆndez, Pedro Pou, Ricardo L￿pez-Murphy and Mario Blejer, all former finance
ministers or central bank presidents), top IMF officials (Anne Krueger, Anoop Singh
and former chief economist Michael Mussa), a few academics and one US
government official.]
Fiscal policy and the public debt of Argentina did, of course, play a major role in the
tragedy there, in the sense that the country surely would have been less vulnerable
to adverse economic, financial or political shocks if the fiscal accounts had been in
surplus instead of in deficit, and if the stock of public debt had fallen instead of
grown. But we know from recent Asian and even past Latin American experience ￿
recall the cases of Chile and Uruguay in the early 1980s ￿ that countries can end up
experiencing major economic, financial and political crises even if their
governments have been running surpluses and paying down the public debt.
Therefore, while I freely agree that running a fiscal surplus is generally safer than
running a deficit, and that having little debt is usually wiser than having a lot of
debt ￿ in the sense that your chances of getting into trouble are probably lower,
and your chances of getting out of trouble quickly are probably higher ￿ I am
definitely not in the ￿It￿s Mostly Fiscal (IMF)￿ camp when it comes to explaining the
debacle in Argentina.ANALYSIS
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Fiscal balance 4.8 5.4 2.6
Government debt 44.5 30.9 22.7
Uruguay
Fiscal balance 0.2 0.1 -0.1
Government debt 12.5 8.9 8.3
1994 1995 1996
Indonesia
Fiscal balance 0.3 1.0 1.3
Government debt 36.6 30.8 23.9
South Korea
Fiscal balance 0.3 0.3 0.3
Government debt 9.4 8.4 8.0
Thailand
Fiscal balance 1.9 3.0 2.4
Government debt 6.0 4.6 3.8
* Data for central governments, not for their public sector as a whole (because of unavailability).
Source: IIF, IMF, ABN AMRO
Fiscal trends during the 1990s
Let me highlight the facts as we know them from the available data, and that is not
as simple as it sounds because even on the website of Argentina￿s Ministry of
Economy (see www.mecon.gov.ar) you can find statistical series on spending and
revenues according to various definitions and levels of aggregation that are
inconsistent with one another. First, there was no significant increase in primary
spending (namely, spending excluding interest payments) at the federal, state and
local levels relative to GDP during the last decade if you disregard, as you should
for various reasons (eg because of hyperinflation-related distortions in relative
prices), the observations from the early 1990s. A comparison of annual averages
between 1994-96 and 1998-2000 shows an increase in said spending of no more
than half of one percent of GDP (from 23.7% to 24.2% of GDP, using a data series
validated by the IMF). Therefore, we are not dealing with a country where primary
government spending ran amok. A separate statistical series on the number of civil
servants employed by federal and provincial governments likewise shows a minor,
7% increase in total average headcount between 1994-96 and 1998-2000 (from
1.67m to 1.78m employees), and a minuscule increase in the bureaucracy as
percent of the total labour force (from 12.3% to 12.5%) during said period. This
does not mean, of course, that given the rigid exchange-rate regime and two
major, adverse exogenous shocks (the Mexico crisis of 1995 and the Russia-cum-
Brazil crisis of 1998-99), it would not have been prudent to have held primary
spending constant in nominal terms or to have cut it ￿ in absolute terms, never
mind relative to GDP. The downsizing of primary government spending and of the
bureaucracy was, at the very least, a missed opportunity.ANALYSIS
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Chart 1 : Government non-interest expenditures
(% of GDP)
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Provinces Federal govt*
Source: Ministerio de Econom￿a, IMF, ABN AMRO * Excluding employees at state-owned enterprises, most of which were sold off.
Source: Ministerio de Econom￿a, IMF, ABN AMRO
Second, there was a significant increase in non-primary government spending
relative to GDP, namely, in interest payments on the public debt. These payments
rose from the equivalent of 1.5% of GDP in 1993-94 to 3.5% of GDP by 1999 and
more than 4% of GDP in 2000-01. While part of the explanation for this trend is the
continued growth of the stock of public debt during the 1990s (from the equivalent
of less than 35% of GDP prior to 1995 to more than 51% of GDP by 2000), the
main explanations lie elsewhere. The government had issued Brady-type bonds that
had initial coupon payments that were low but were scheduled to increase (namely,
step up) during the 1990s, and then there were other government bonds that had a
grace period on interest payments during which said payments were capitalised. As
time passed, these chickens came home to roost with heavy budgetary
implications. The increases in the government￿s interest bill were quite predictable
and should have been offset ￿ and not through creative accounting and financial
engineering of the type that we saw in the final stages of Argentina￿s drama, but
through the pursuit of a much more thrifty fiscal policy during the second half of
the 1990s. The government had managed to register primary fiscal surpluses of
1.5% of GDP in 1992-93, but in the period 1994-2000 it posted three years of
primary deficits (1995-96 and 1999) and four years of primary surpluses averaging
a meagre 0.3% of GDP.ANALYSIS
EMERGING MARKETS FORTNIGHTLY 24 JULY 2002 4








1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Source: Ministerio de Econom￿a, IMF, ABN AMRO
Third, the government suffered from a chronic shortfall in revenues. Tax collections
and other revenues net of privatisation income peaked in 1994 (at 24.3% of GDP)
and declined during the next five years ￿ despite various hikes in tax rates (eg in
the VAT from 18% to 21%), base-broadening measures, enforcement initiatives
and much tinkering with the tax structure. One reason is the pension reform
implemented in mid-1994, which allowed for the deviation of employee
contributions to privately run pension funds. The transition costs of this pension
reform were on the order of 1% of GDP per annum. The fiscal implications of the
reform were also quite predictable and likewise should have been offset for the
sake of fiscal prudence. The other reason for the shortfall in revenues, I believe, is
that as cost-cutting pressures in the private sector became intense, especially after
the economy lost international competitiveness in the late 1990s (due to the
dollar￿s appreciation and the Brazilian Real￿s sharp devaluation), tax evasion and
avoidance grew out of control. Companies started to view tax payments as another
cost of doing business that had to be minimised in the face of a grossly overvalued
peso, and individuals sought to reduce their tax burden to maximise their
disposable income as living standards started to fall. The structural changes that
took place in Argentina during the 1990s meant that tax-paying jobs in the formal
economy were destroyed (eg in state-owned companies that were privatised) and
that most new jobs were created only in the underground economy. After 1998, as
the employment situation worsened, most Argentines increasingly felt that they had
to choose between paying taxes and paying the rent ￿ and there is no question that
more and more opted to do the latter.ANALYSIS
EMERGING MARKETS FORTNIGHTLY 24 JULY 2002 5









1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Source: Ministerio de Econom￿a, IMF, ABN AMRO
The crucial role of the exchange-rate regime
And this leads me to delve deeper into the relationship between the exchange rate
regime and the fiscal accounts, which was highly detrimental. One link is this one
that I just mentioned: I believe that the fixed exchange rate regime undermined
the government￿s revenue base by encouraging tax evasion, especially when
Argentina lost international competitiveness in the late 1990s. In the face of rising
interest payments on the public debt, it was practically impossible to balance the
government budget, and thus to generate prudent primary fiscal surpluses, unless
it was by slashing government spending via layoffs of civil servants or cuts in
salaries and pensions ￿ which the political class was understandably reluctant to
approve, although under extreme duress and in the end it did.
But the most potent and ultimately deadly link is that between the exchange rate
regime and the public debt. The one-to-one regime encouraged the government
(and also the private sector) to take on mostly foreign-currency-denominated debt.
Indeed, by late last year, only 3% of the public debt was denominated in Argentine
pesos. This represented a huge potential liability, because when one peso was
equal to one dollar, the public debt was equivalent to some 50% of GDP (eg in
2000), but if ever one peso no longer purchased one dollar, then the country￿s debt
ratios would instantly grow out of control: at an exchange rate of 2 ARS/USD, the
mostly foreign-currency-denominated public debt would jump to the equivalent of
about 100% of GDP, and at 3 ARS/USD it would jump further to 150% of GDP. How
could a government that collected tax revenues only in pesos, had long ago sold all
of its assets that could attract dollars, and was legally prevented even from printing
pesos ￿ the autonomous central bank was authorised to issue pesos only in
exchange for dollars ￿ have only 3% of its liabilities denominated in pesos? And
yet, I never heard any criticism of this irresponsible currency mismatch either in
Washington or elsewhere ￿ a policy that ensured that, if ever there was a change in
the currency regime involving a devaluation, the public sector would be rendered
instantly insolvent. All of the talk in policy and academic circles was about the fact
that the public debt was creeping up over time (as noted, from the equivalent of
35% of GDP before 1995 to 51% by 2000) ￿ a disquieting trend, to be sure, but
not a lethal one as long as the exchange rate was kept unchanged.ANALYSIS
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* Mostly British pounds and Swiss francs.
Source: Ministerio de Econom￿a, ABN AMRO
In sum, I agree that fiscal policy in Argentina during the 1990s was not as prudent
as it should have been, considering everything that was known and should have
been known at the time ￿ and I￿m talking about the period of ￿fat cows￿ prior to
1998 as well as the period of ￿lean cows￿ after 1998. But I blame the artificial one-
peso-equals-one-dollar exchange-rate regime much, much more for all of the ills
that afflict Argentina today ￿ including the fiscal ills.
Indeed, I regard the failure of most economists to realise back in the 1970s that the
shift from fixed to floating exchange rates in the First World and the exponential
growth of international capital flows put all Third World countries with artificial
exchange-rate regimes at critical risk, as the greatest failure of our profession in the
second half of the 20th century. These inflexible regimes were bound to prove unable
to withstand the growth of market forces and the ups and downs of the world
economy (commodity prices, interest rates, capital flows and the like). Moreover,
they were bound to prove ruinous in a fast-globalising world, because they
encouraged banks, companies and governments to take on hard-currency debt while
exchange rates were held fixed artificially, only to render them all bankrupt once said
exchange-rate regimes were modified or ditched. We could have prevented the many
currency-cum-debt crises of the 1980s and the many currency-cum-debt crises of the
1990s ￿ in Asia, Russia and Latin America, including in Argentina after artificially rigid
exchange-rate regimes during 1977-1981 and again during 1991-2001. We should
not hold politicians responsible for the mess that we economists created.
But no, an inexplicable number of leading economists in policymaking and academic
roles remained enamoured of exchange-rate-based stabilisations, despite mounting
evidence that they worked for a while but proved catastrophic later, and the rest
were inexcusably agnostic on this absolutely crucial policy issue. Even in 1991,
when Domingo Cavallo and Roque FernÆndez came up with the one-to-one
Convertibility Plan for Argentina, there was ample evidence from around the globe
that even more dollarised countries, such as nearby Bolivia and Peru, were able to
halt hyperinflation in its tracks without relying on a fixed exchange rate. If, instead,
government spending or the public debt had been chosen as the means to stabilise
Argentina, I dare say that today we would be celebrating rather than lamenting the
country￿s destiny.
Chart 6 : Inflation in
Bolivia and Peru (peak
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